

new piece whose parameters were originally established by the score. In like manner, grieving is a process wherein individuals engage with an emotional sequence not entirely of their own choosing but which they can imbue with significance that transcends the emotions that serve as the effective ingredients of grief episodes" (45).

As I hope this review makes clear, I think that Cholbi's account of grief gives us ample material with which to improvise. His conceptual analysis of grief and his insightful observations about it are strikingly true to life. His normative account is simultaneously compelling and provocative. The book itself, further, is simply a pleasure to read—which is no mean feat given its subject matter. Cholbi manages to treat his topic with the seriousness it deserves without lapsing into maudlin clichés, and he writes in a way that is at once rigorous and lively. Whether we ultimately reject or accept the central tenets of his particular account, Cholbi has clearly demonstrated grief's philosophical complexities and has given us a fruitful starting point from which to embark on further inquiry into this all-too-human experience.

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Deveaux, Monique. *Poverty, Solidarity, and Poor-Led Social Movements*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp 280. \$74.00 (cloth).

Academic political philosophy usually takes place at some remove from the messy realities of political activism. This is often thought to be a good thing: the philosopher can only remain distinct from a shallow propagandist for a cause, one argument runs, if they theorize from a position above the fray of day-to-day political struggle. *Poverty, Solidarity, and Poor-Led Social Movements* aims to persuade its readers to reject arguments like this and to see the importance instead of making "the insights and practices of poor, justice-seeking communities and their social movements" in the Global South absolutely foundational to scholarly theorizing about justice (25). Philosophers need to abandon their usual hermetic posture of grounding claims only in the writings of other scholars, the book claims, and start learning from the political actors on the ground actually working to resist injustice and build a fairer world.

Deveaux defines a poor-led social movement as a political agent composed of people living in poverty with the aim of challenging and overcoming deprivation by engaging in collective political action of various kinds. These movements typically have a democratic and grassroots organizational structure (rather than being elite led) and are often rooted in a particular urban or rural setting (12–16). This definition is capacious enough to encompass a wide range of concrete actors: some of the most frequently cited examples of such movements in the book are groups like Slum Dwellers International (SDI), a global network composed of various local groups, and Brazil's Landless Workers' Movement or MST. According to Deveaux, poor-led movements like the MST and SDI share the view that it is "deep structural

power inequalities” (96)—embedded in both formal political decision-making institutions and the system of economic production—that ultimately “underpin” (84) poverty. On such a view, it is structural inequalities like these which are responsible for the various symptoms associated with the disease of poverty, such as lack of access to social protection and welfare entitlements, homelessness, wage exploitation, and natural resource and land dispossession. Deveaux cites a statement from the Pamoja Trust—a Kenyan nonprofit that works to organize and empower slum dwellers—in which the living conditions in slums are described as “a manifestation of both power asymmetry between the governed and the governors as well as systematic exclusion of a majority of the urban poor” as particularly exemplary of this insight (55). But she notes that “antipoverty activists everywhere” make similar claims (3).

This claim about the structural nature and causes of poverty is the subject of chapters 2 and 3 and the central insight of poor-led movements, which, the book argues, global justice theorists should be “studying and learning from” (7). This insight is taken to be highly valuable because it can help correct the oversimplified conceptualization of what poverty is and what causes it often present in work by leading global justice theorists. Deveaux singles out Peter Singer and the broader effective altruism movement for particular criticism in this regard. Philosophers like Singer understand poverty, Deveaux argues, “as synonymous with needs scarcity” and focus only on its “proximate causes (lack of food, clean water, shelter, housing, healthcare, education)” (60). But such definitions underplay the significance of the underlying structures that give rise to this maldistribution of resources, structures which are often front and center in the discourses and claims of the organized poor themselves.

The main problem here is that when global justice theorists fail to grasp or adequately understand what poverty actually is and what causes it, this leads them to offer inadequate and problematic accounts of what is needed to overcome it. The “consideration of far-reaching alternatives to globalized capitalism, including those championed by poor-led social movements,” such as “worker cooperatives, the transformation of property rights and regimes, and the expansion of social and economic entitlements,” is blocked from view, and the focus instead is on a much narrower set of potential individual contributions, such as charity donations (27).

The suggestion that poverty remains widespread because many members of the political communities of the Global South lack important kinds of political and economic power is one to which I was intuitively very sympathetic. But I still found myself wanting much more detail here about the structural account of poverty to really assess its plausibility. It could be objected that poor-led movements have more pressing concerns, and that it is thus unfair to request that they perform a fine-grained spelling out of their favored account of poverty. But I also found Deveaux’s discussion of the scholarly approach to poverty which most clearly builds on and expands this insight—the so-called relational approach to poverty—similarly underdeveloped.

Which social structures play the biggest role in driving deprivation in this account exactly, and how do they intersect? For example, is lack of power in one social structure more fundamental than others, or are all equally important? What are the specific causal connections between—for instance—unequal conditions of

economic production and wage exploitation? And how exactly does a lack of power over political decision-making lead to a lack of social protection? Deveaux also mentions in passing at several points the important role played by the discriminatory attitudes and social norms of participants in social structures in perpetuating poverty (80, 98). But again, I would have liked more detail here about the place of social norms in social structures and their reproduction. Sometimes Deveaux's discussion of social structures sounded reminiscent of Rawls's concept of the "basic structure"—the major political and economic institutions which have the biggest effects on our life prospects—but the similarities and differences between Rawls's account and the one presented here are never elucidated.

I also found it a pity that the book does not draw on the now fairly substantial literature in social ontology on the various building blocks of social structures and the nature of structural explanations, as this could perhaps have led to a more conceptually robust account (e.g., Sally Haslanger, "What Is a (Social) Structural Explanation?," *Philosophical Studies* 173 [2016]: 113–30). For a book which repeatedly emphasizes the intellectual and political importance of clear conceptualizations of key terms in the global justice debate, this crucial conceptual stage in the book's overall argument struck me as being passed over much too quickly.

In addition to poor-led movements possessing crucial insights into the nature of poverty and its causes, Deveaux also claims that these agents demonstrate important ways in which justice can be advanced on the ground from which many global justice theorists can also learn. Deveaux highlights three such justice-advancing contributions which she claims poor-led movements are well-placed to make, the first two of which relate to the way poor-led movements transform the situation of the poor themselves. First, these agents can raise consciousness in valuable ways, and second, they can develop the poor's capacities for political contention and cooperation. The final contribution relates to the broader context within which the poor must operate politically: poor-led movements can also challenge beliefs among the nonpoor which are justice inhibiting. It is these three justice-advancing contributions which are the subject of chapters 4 and 5 of the book.

Deveaux understands consciousness raising as involving attempts by poor-led movements to generate greater "awareness of the structural and political character of . . . poverty" among the poor themselves (110). For example, many members of the poor will consciously or unconsciously subscribe to beliefs about "the naturalness of landed wealth and class distinctions" (130), and social movements have a vital role to play in transforming these mistaken beliefs. The book claims that the work of the MST in Brazil exemplifies this process of transformation: both participation in collective acts of land occupation and more formal popular education initiatives are effectively used by this group to transform beliefs in justice-advancing ways (115–18). The shack dwellers' movement in South Africa, the book notes, also sometimes refers to its occupations as "universities," with the creation of pamphlets and protest songs within these encampments, as well as its regular meetings, viewed as venues for raising the consciousness of those present (117).

The book also claims that poor-led movements are well-placed to develop the poor's capacities and skills for political contention and cooperation. Capacities and skills for political organizing and mobilizing are improved through participation in movement meetings and protests, skills which enable the poor to better

push for social reform in the face of fierce resistance from the beneficiaries of the status quo (166). Enhanced capacities for cooperative productive activity also emerge as particularly crucial. Here we have the example of Nijera Kori, an organization in Bangladesh aiming to organize the landless poor, which offers greater financial security to its members through participation in credit and savings initiatives (163). Participants in such schemes learn the skills necessary for establishing and managing them, including collective decision-making and problem-solving, which enables the organized poor not merely to make strides toward justice in the long term but also to address some of their most pressing problems in the here and now.

A final way in which poor-led movements can make valuable justice-advancing contributions is referred to by Deveaux as “politicizing” both the causes of and remedies to poverty among the nonpoor in public discourse (111). This contribution involves engaging in direct action, protest, and claim making with the aim of debunking certain dominant assumptions about poverty which normalize radical inequalities and are thus justice inhibiting. A key example here is the work of the Argentinian *Piqueteros*, a social movement that used roadblocks to protest unemployment, and which played a key role in changing public narratives and thereby creating greater political pressure for reforms like expanded income support (135).

Deveaux claims that global justice theorists have a lot to learn from these three sets of activities undertaken by poor-led movements. Specifically, they enable a vast improvement on the overly “restrictive view of *who* can be agents of justice” that is common in the global justice debate (75). Theorists often focus only on the justice-advancing contributions of Global North–based nongovernmental organizations, international institutions like the World Trade Organization, and the wealthiest nation-states and corporations, thereby implicitly treating the poor themselves as unable to contribute to just social change. This narrow focus—which Deveaux finds to be exemplified in the work of Thomas Pogge in particular (71)—results from bundling together the issue of who is responsible for causing poverty with the question of which agents should be key to overcoming it (12). But Deveaux points out that, once we get clear about the significant contributions the poor are already making on the ground, we must acknowledge that the poor have a very significant role to play in instituting antipoverty remedies, despite not being responsible for the indignities they face.

The book is clear that, despite the significance of the contributions poor-led movements are capable of making, it is highly unlikely that these agents can achieve global justice entirely on their own. Deveaux thus still recognizes a place for the kinds of agents more typically mentioned by global justice theorists like Pogge. But, on the book’s account, it is poor-led movements that ought to form the leading edge of the struggle against global poverty. The place for the various actors in the Global North is then much more circumscribed than is typically thought to be the case: these agents ought to be “effective allies,” acting in solidarity with and broadly deferring to the strategic priorities of poor-led movements (232). Global North agents thus have a limited but nonetheless important role to play, the final chapter highlights, in assisting poor-led social movements by denouncing anti-poor regimes in the Global South; pressuring wealthy governments to enact pro-poor aid; challenging false beliefs among the citizens of wealthy nations about the nature, causes, and consequences of poverty in the Global South;

lobbying against international debt, trade, and austerity policies which are harmful to the poor; and offering legal and financial assistance when requested.

The view that poor-led social movements ought to play a significant role in efforts to remedy global poverty has considerable appeal. But, arguably, Deveaux's extended discussions of the activities of the MST, South African shack dwellers, Nijera Kori, and the *Piqueteros* only really substantiate the claim that poor-led movements have previously made important justice-advancing contributions, whereas what the book is ultimately seeking to defend, as its introduction makes clear, is the much larger claim that poor-led movements are always, or at least almost always, "uniquely placed . . . to . . . challenge poverty-perpetuating social relations and structures" (25). But I doubt that we can slide as easily from this first claim to the second as the book seems to suggest.

One reason I remain skeptical of this stronger claim that poor-led social movements ought to always or almost always form the leading edge of the struggle against global injustice is that the examples of the contributions poor-led movements can make are drawn from a relatively narrow range of cases. Deveaux repeatedly describes her focus as being on poor-led activism in the Global South as a whole (e.g., 20, 38). But her examples of the practical contributions made by these movements are in fact overwhelmingly drawn from countries classified by the World Bank and United Nations as "upper middle-income" or "emerging" economies, like Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa. While some passing mention is made of movements in the comparatively poorer nations of Bangladesh and Kenya, I could find no discussion at all of poor-led movements based in the many nations of West Africa (e.g., Liberia, Niger, Sierra Leone) and Central Africa (e.g., the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo) that continue to dominate lists of the "least developed" and "lowest income" countries in the world.

Of course, major poverty—however we want to define it—certainly remains in the countries on which Deveaux does focus. But the narrow geographic scope of her examples, and her general neglect of Africa in particular, still struck me as a major oversight. For surely any persuasive account of the central role that poor-led movements always ought to play in alleviating global poverty should concentrate heavily on their prospects for success in the very poorest regions and countries of the globe. I do not mean to suggest that Deveaux's basic claims (about the way poor-led movements can effectively raise the consciousness and build the collective capabilities of the poor, as well as politicize poverty among the wider public) simply will not extend to these places. Sierra Leone, for instance, has a federation doing important work within the SDI network: the Sierra Leone Federation of the Urban and Rural Poor (Joseph Macarthy et al., "The 'Slow Anatomy of Change': Urban Knowledge Trajectories towards an Inclusive Settlement Upgrading Agenda in Freetown, Sierra Leone," *Environment and Urbanization* 34 [2022]: 294–312, 301). But the crucial point is that without substantial discussion of the agents operating in areas like these and how the work being undertaken here is similar to and different from that being undertaken in countries like Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa, the reader is simply left in the dark as to the applicability of the argument to these regions. This leads to serious worries about the generalizability of the descriptive claims made in the book.

The book emphasizes the way in which the movements on which it focuses are truly “grassroots” actors, with leaders often emerging “from the communities from which the movement draws its members” (44). For Deveaux, this means that the interests advocated for by poor-led movements are usually directly representative of the broader communities in which they are embedded. Worries that these organizations are speaking on behalf of some other constituency whose views are not adequately represented or captured by the group “simply do not apply,” she argues (44). Perhaps this is true at the level of a single grassroots movement, sufficiently well embedded in its local community. But what I am suggesting is that a similar worry in fact reappears at the global level: the groups discussed in this book are emerging from one particular subsection of the overall Global South, so we should not assume that the interests, concerns, and strategies deployed by these movements adequately represent the poor of the Global South taken as a whole. Poor-led movements in the many countries of the Global South not mentioned by Deveaux (particularly those from Central and West Africa) may well undertake political responses to their condition and possess concerns that diverge at least somewhat from the interests and concerns of poor-led movements discussed in the book. *Poverty, Solidarity, and Poor-Led Social Movements* thus cannot plausibly claim to be a comprehensive discussion of the agency of the poor in the Global South, in my view, when it essentially ignores whole swathes of it, and the poorest swathes at that.

Despite the two reservations I have raised here, this remains a book rich with suggestions for novel directions in which to take the philosophical debate over global justice. To date, this debate has overwhelmingly focused on clarifying and comparing various abstract moral principles of global justice (beneficence, global egalitarianism, human rights, etc.) and on applying these principles to specific issues like poverty, health care, climate change, trade, and so on. In my view, it is high time that scholars seek to address the various gaps this two-pronged focus on principles and their application overlooks, including, perhaps most importantly, questions of agency and transition. For those sympathetic to such a view, Deveaux’s book should be welcomed as a breath of fresh air. This book will act as a blueprint for future scholarly attempts to engage in these oft-overlooked nonideal questions, especially given the way it is able to combine relatively abstract political theorizing so successfully with empirical work from critical development scholars and social movement researchers.

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Elgat, Guy. *Being Guilty: Freedom, Responsibility, and Conscience in German Philosophy from Kant to Heidegger*.

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Guilt, as Guy Elgat first introduces us to it, is a feeling: “the unpleasant feeling for having done wrong in some sense” (1–2). But this, it quickly becomes clear, is merely guilt as surface phenomenon, and the question that animates Elgat’s book